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Judicial District Court - Ada Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2008-20018 Current Judge: Ronald J. Wilper 
David Fuller, etal. vs. Dave Callister, etal. 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
David Fuller, Shirley Fuller vs. Dave Callister, Confluence Management LLC, Liberty Partners Inc 
Date Code User Judge 
10/21/2008 NCOC CCGARDAL New Case Filed - Other Claims Ronald J. Wilper 
COMP CCGARDAL Complaint Filed Ronald J. Wilper 
SMFI CCGARDAL Summons Filed (3) Ronald J. Wilper 
12/1/2008 AMCO CCGARDAL Amended Complaint Filed Ronald J. Wi/per 
12/12/2008 NOlO CCDWONCP Three Day Notice Of Intent To Take Default Ronald J. Wilper 
12/22/2008 NOAP MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Appearance M Jones for Callister, Ronald J. Wilper 
Confluence and Liberty 
ANSW MCBIEHKJ Answer Jones for Callister Confluence and Uberty Ronald J. Wilper 
12/31/2008 NOTC DCJOHNSI Notice of Status Conf Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC DCJOHNSI Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/03/2009 04:00 Ronald J. Wi/per 
PM) 
1/1412009 NOSV CCGWALAC Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wi/per 
2/3/2009 STIP MCBIEHKJ Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Ronald J. Wilper 
HRVC DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Status held on 02/03/2009 Ronald J. Wi/per 
04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
2/1312009 HRSC DCABBOSM Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/21/200909:00 Ronald J. Wilper 
AM) 4 days 
HRSC DCABBOSM Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference Ronald J. Wilper 
10/13/2009 03:30 PM) 
ORDR DCABBOSM Order Setting Proceedings and Trial Ronald J. Wi/per 
2/18/2009 NOSV CCGARDAL Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
3/19/2009 NOTS CCDWONCP Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
3/26/2009 NOTS CCRANDJD Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
6/23/2009 MOTN CCTOWNRD Motion for Order Shortening Time Ronald J. Wilper 
AFSM CCTOWNRD Affidavit In Support Of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
NOHG CCTOWNRD Notice Of Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCTOWNRD Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment 07/20/2009 11 :00 AM) 
MOSJ CCBOYIDR Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Ronald J. Wi/per 
AFFD CCBOYIDR (2) Affidavit in Support of Motion for Partial Ronald J. Wilper 
Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment 
6/25/2009 ORDR DCJOHNSI Order to Shorten Time Ronald J. Wilper 
7/6/2009 MEMO CCWRIGRM Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Ronald J. Wilper 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of Michael R Jones Ronald J. Wilper 
7/10/2009 REPL CCHOLMEE Reply Brief to Memorandum in Opposition to Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCHOLMEE Supplemental Affidavit of Ed J Guerricabeitia in Ronald J. Wilper 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
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Date Code User Judge 
7/20/2009 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment held on 07/20/2009 11 :00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated:50 
8/24/2009 DEOP DCJOHNSI Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 
Partial Summary Judgment 
9/1/2009 OBJC CCTOWNRD Objection to the Form of Defendant's Proposed Ronald J. Wilper 
Judgment 
NOHG CCTOWNRD Notice Of Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCTOWNRD Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Ronald J. Wilper 
09/28/200902:00 PM) Objection to Form of 
Defendant's Proposed Judgment 
9/2812009 JDMT DCJOHNSI Judgment Against Plaintiffs Ronald J. Wilper 
CDIS DCJOHNSI Civil Disposition entered for: Callister, Dave, Ronald J. Wilper 
Defendant; Confluence Management LLC, 
Defendant; Liberty Partners Inc, Defendant; 
Fuller, David, Plaintiff; Fuller, Shirley, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 9/28/2009 
STAT DCJOHNSI STATUS CHANGED: Closed Ronald J. Wilper 
10/9/2009 MEMC CCPRICDL Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees Ronald J. Wilper 
AFSM CCPRICDL Affidavit In Support Of Memorandum and Ronald J. Wilper 
Attorney Fees 
APSC CCTHIEBJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Ronald J. Wilper 
10/21/2009 MOTN CCPRICDL Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Defendant's Costs Ronald J. Wilper 
and Attorney Fees 
MOTN CCPRICDL Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Decision on Attorney Ronald J. Wilper 
Fees and Costs Pending Appeal 
MEMO CCPRICDL Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of their Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
NOTH CCPRICDL Notice Of Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
HRSC CCPRICDL Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/09/200903:30 Ronald J. Wilper 
AM) to Disallow Defendant's Attorney Costs 
STAT CCPRICDL STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Ronald J. Wilper 
action 
10/27/2009 CONT DCJOHNSI Continued (Motion 11/09/200903:30 PM) to Ronald J. Wilper 
Disallow Defendant's Attorney Costs 
11/6/2009 REPL CCNELSRF Defendants Reply to Plainitiffs Memorandum to Ronald J. Wilper 
Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
11/9/2009 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion held on 11/09/2009 Ronald J. Wilper 
03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: to Disallow Defendant's Attorney 00004 Costs-50 
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CASE NO.: CV OC 0820018 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, David and Shirley Fuller, by and through their attorneys of 
record of the firm, Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, and hereby submits this memorandum in 
support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 20, 2005, Plaintiffs entered into a Commercial/Investment Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement with Defendant Cont1uence Management, LLC. See AfT of 
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Fuller, Ex. A. That same day, the parties executed an Addendum where Plaintiffs were to 
receive the funds paid by ACHD. See id., Ex. B. 
On September 22. 2005, PlaintitTs and Defendants Conf1uence Management and Liberty 
Partners executed another Addendum where PlaintitTs consented to the prope11y vesting with 
Liberty Partners. See id., Ex. C. 
On August 10, 2006, Defendant Liberty Partners executed a Sale and Purchase 
Agreement with ACHD and warranty deed conveying a portion of the property. See AfT. ofEJG, 
Exs. A & B. 
On or about August 25,2006, ACHD issued a check to Transnation Title & Escrow in the 
amount of$83,921.00 for the property ACHD acquired. See id., Ex. C. The property closed on 
October 20,2006 at LandAmerica Transnation and a payment of $83,921.00 was issued to 
Liberty Partners, Inc. See id., Ex. D. 
Neither Defendants Confluence Management or Liberty Partners turn over the 
condemnation proceeds received from ACHD to Plaintiffs. See Aff. of Fuller. 
II. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if no genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Orlhman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 600, 944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). 
Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or 
draw cont1icting inferences from evidence. Id. A "material fact" for summary judgment 
purposes is one upon which the outcome of the case may be different. Peterson v. Romine, 131 
Idaho 537, 540, 960.P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998). In determining whether or not to grant summary 
judgment, the court is to liberally construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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of the nonmoving party. Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771,774,828 P.2d 334,337 (Ct. App. 
1992). Nevertheless, raising doubts as to a material fact is not sufficient because the nonmoving 
party must produce substantial evidence that demonstrates a material fact is in dispute, a mere 
scintilla of evidence is not sufficient. Ambrose v. Buhl Joint School District #412, 126 Idaho 
581,583,887 P.2d 1088, 1091 (et. App. 1994). 
B. The Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement did not 
Merge with the Recorded Warranty Deed. 
In their Answer, Defendants alleged as their ninth affirmative defense that "Plaintiffs 
claim for relief is barred against all Defendants because all contractual obligations contained in 
the Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement merged with the recorded 
Warranty Deed." See Defendants' Answer. 
As part of the Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement 
executed by the Plaintiffs and Defendant Confluence Management on September 20,2005, the 
parties executed an Addendum that same day where Defendant Confluence Management and 
Plaintiffs agreed to reserve the proceeds from the acquisition of a portion of the subject property 
by ACHD under the threat or condemnation to Plaintiffs. The Agreement was assigned to 
Delcndant Liberty Partners, Inc. on September 22,2005 and Plaintiffs executed a Warranty Deed 
for the benefit of Defendant Liberty Partners, Inc. Defendant Liberty Partners, Inc. negotiated 
wi th ACHD for the sale of a portion of the property and kept the proceeds paid by ACHD in 
breach of the Agreement. 
In Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 118 P.3d 99 (2005), the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained the application of the doctrine of merger of a real estate agreement and the deed. 
Here, Sells sold 20 acres of their property to Robinson. Under their agreement, Sells 
granted an easement on their remaining portion of property and the timber rights on that 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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easement were included. After the execution of the agreement, the Sells executed a warranty 
deed which described the Robinson easement over the Sells' property and timber rights located 
on the easement. Robinson interpreted that both the agreement and warranty deed granted him 
timber rights to all of Sells' remaining property and proceeded to log his twenty acres, as well as 
the Sells remaining acres. 
Sells sued Robinson for trespass and conversion and the case was tried to the court 
without a jury. The court found in Sells favor and applied the doctrine of merger holding the 
agreement merged into the deed so only the terms of deed would be considered. Robinson 
appealed the court's ruling. 
Relying on its past decision in Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879 
(1966), the Court defined the doctrine of merger as follows: 
[T]he acceptance of a deed to premises generally is considered as a merger of the 
agreements of an antecedent contract into the terms of the deed, and any claim for 
relief must be based on the covenants of agreements contained in the deed, not the 
covenants or agreements contained in the prior agreement. (Citation omitted). 
The Court recognized that an exception to merger exists, "where under the 
contract the rights are conferred collaterally and independent of the deed; there 
being no presumption that the party in accepting the deed intends to give up the 
covenants of which the deed is not performance or satisfaction." However, the 
Court noted that, "[w]here the right claimed under the contract would vary, 
change, or alter the agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the very subject-
matter 'with which the deed deals, a prior contract covering the same subject-
matter cannot be sho'wn against the provisions of the deed" (Emphasis 
included). 
lei., 141 Idaho at 771-72. 
The Court affirmed the district court's application of the doctrine of merger holding that 
the terms of the agreement sought to be enforced by Robinson inhered to the vary subject-matter 
dealt with by the deed, i.e. the timber on the Sells' property. The Court found that the timber 
language in the agreement did not constitute a collateral agreement independent of the deed. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
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In Jolley, infra., the Idaho Supreme Court further elaborated on the doctrine of merger, 
explaining: 
"In the absence of fraud, mistake, etc., the following stipulations in contracts for 
the sale of real estate are conclusively presumed to be merged in a subsequently 
delivered and accepted deed made in pursuance of such contract, to wit: (1) Those 
that inhere in the very subject-matter of the deed, such as title, possession, 
emblements, etc; (2) those carried into the deed and of the same effect; (3) those 
of which the subject -matter in the deed. In such cases the deed alone must be 
looked at in determining the rights of the parties. 
""But where there are stipulations in such preliminary contract of which the 
delivery and acceptance of the deed is not a performance, the question to be 
determined is whether the parties have intentionally surrendered or waived such 
stipulations. If such intention appears in the deed, it is decisive; if not, then resort 
may be had to other evidence. 
"The authorities may perhaps be reconciled by a determination of what are 
'collateral stipulations.' If the stipulation has reference to title, possession, 
quantity, or emblements of the land, it is generally, but not always, held to inhere 
in the very subject-matter with which the deed deals, and is merged therein." 
ld., 90 Idaho at 383. 
In the instant case, the contract reserving the condemnation proceeds with Plaintiffs do 
not inhere in the very subject-matter of the deed nor makes reference to the title, possession. 
quantity or emblements of the land. Instead it deals with money. 
Based upon the foregoing case law, PlaintifTs respectfully request this Court enter its 
Order dismissing Defendants ninth affirmative defense. 
C. The Assignment of the Property Does Not Relieve Defendant Confluence 
Management of Liability under the Agreement. 
Defendants alleged as their eighth affirmative defense that "Plaintiffs claim for relief 
should be barred against Confluence because Confluence assigned all right to the 
Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement that is subject of this suit to 
Defendant Liberty. The assignment was agreed to and accepted by PlaintifTs thereby releasing 
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Cont1uence from all obligations to Plaintiffs pursuant to said Commercial/Investment Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement." Defendants claim that the novation relieves Defendant 
Contluence of any liability under the contract. 
Specifically, the assignment/novation states: 
The undersigned sellers and buyers agree to the following: 
1. The buyers of said property will be assigned to vest as Liberty Partners, Inc. All other 
tem1s and conditions shall remain the same. See AfT. of Fuller, Ex. B. 
PlaintifTs executed the document along with Defendants Cont1uence Management and 
Liberty Partners. 
In George W Watkins Family v. lvlessenger, 115 Idaho 386, 766 P.2d 1267 (App.1988), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed whether a lessee's assignment to a third party relieved him 
of liability from the landlord who consented to the assignment. 
On appeal, the lessee argued that the landlord's consent to the assignment relieved him of 
liability. The Court of appeals reviewed the lease agreement and held as follows: 
In our view the quoted language clearly holds the lessee primarily obligated in the 
event of an assignment and subsequent default by the assignee. Absent an express 
novation, a lessee remains in privity of contract with the lessors and is a guarantor 
for performance of the covenants in the agreement. (Citation omitted). There is 
no express novation here. We hold that the lessors' consent to an assignment did 
not relieve the lessee of his obligation under the lease agreement. 
Id., 115 Idaho at 390. 
A mere assignment does not release the assignor from his or her obligations to the other 
party under the assigned contract, absent an agreement that can be applied from the facts other 
than the other contracting party's consent to the assignment. See Seagull Ener6"Y E&P, Inc. v. 
Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342 (Tex.2006). 
Even if the assignee assumes the obligations of the contract, the assignor remains 
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secondarily liable as a surety or guarantor. See Roget v. Grand Pontiac, Inc., 5 P.3d 341 
(Colo.Ct.App. 1 999). 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs only consented to the property vesting to Liberty Partners. 
The assignment does not expressly state or relieve Conf1uence Management of its obligations 
under the Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement dated September 
20,2005 wherein the ACHD condemnation proceeds were reserved to the Plaintiffs. 
Since Liberty Partners took the ACHD proceeds and failed to turn it over to Plaintiffs, 
ConL1uence Management is still obligated under the contract to pay said funds to Plaintiffs. 
Based upon the foregoing case law, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court enter its 
Order dismissing Defendants eighth affirmative defense. 
D. Defendants Confluence Management and Liberty Partners Breached the 
Agreement by Failing to Return the ACHD proceeds to Plaintiffs. 
As noted above, Defendant Conf1uence Management is still obligated to pay the proceeds 
received from ACHD to PlaintitTs pursuant to the terms of their contract. 
It is undisputed that Liberty Partners received the proceeds paid by ACHD for the 
acquisition of a portion of the property which was reserved to Plaintiffs under their agreement 
with Conf1uence Management. See Aff. of EJG, Exs. A, B & c. 
The reservation of the condemnation proceeds was a material part of the agreement 
which Defendants Conf1uence Management and Liberty Partners breached. Whether Defendant 
Liberty Partners assumed Cont1uence Management's obligations under the contract is irrelevant 
as PlaintitTs never expressly released Cont1uence Management of its obligations under the 
agreement. 
ACHD issued a check in the amount of $83,921.00 to the escrow agent who in turn 
issued payment in that amount to Liberty Partners who failed to turn over the proceeds to 
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Plaintiffs. See Aff. of EJG, Exs. A, B & c. 
Based upon the undisputed facts, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court enter its Order 
for partial summary judgment against Defendants Cont1uence Management, LLC and Liberty 
Partners, Inc. in the amount of $83,921.00, plus prejudgment interest accruing from the date of 
the settlement, October 10,2006. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts and case authority provided herein, Plaintiffs 
respectfully request this Court enter partial summary judgment in favor of PlaintitTs and dismiss 
Defendants' eighth and ninth affirmative defenses, as well as, enter partial summary judgment 
against Defendant Cont1uence Management, LLC in the an10unt of $83,921.00, plus accrued pre-
judgment. 
f') ttl 
DATED this _.,(_}_ day ofJune, 2009. 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theUaay ofJune, 2009 a true and correct original of the 
foregoing was served upon the following by the method indicated below: 
Michael R. Jones 
Michael R. Jones PLLC 
508 North 13th Street 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
U.S. MAIL 
_X_ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile Transmission: 
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Michael R. Jones 
MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7743 
508 North 13th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 385-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9103 
ISB No. 2221 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a ) 
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CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, ) 
an Idaho limited liability company, and ) 





CASE NO. CV OC 0820018 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTU'FS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Defendants, DAVID CALLISTER ("Callister"), CONFLUENCE 
MANAGEMENT, LLC ("Confluence Management"), and LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC. 
("Liherty Partners"), by and through their counsel of record, Michael R. Jones, and submit the 
following Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. This 
memorandum in further supported by the accompanying affidavit of Michael R. Jones. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE I 
00015 
I. 
THE QUESTION PLACED AT ISSUE IN PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On or about September 20, 2005 , the Fuller Plaintiffs sold 12.73 acres of property 
located at the common address, 890 N. Ten Mile Road, in or near the city of Meridian, Ada 
County, Idaho to the Defendant Liberty Partners for slightly more than 1.25 million dollars 
($1,273,000.00). Liberty Partners was the contract assignee of the Defendant Confluence 
Management, the entity that had originally entered into the purchase/sale agreement with the 
Fullers. 
Almost one year later, on or about August 10, 2006, the Ada County Highway District 
("ACHD") paid Liberty Partners $83,921.00 for the purchase of slightly less than one acre (.99 
acre) out of the 12.73 acres that had been previously sold by the Fullers to Confluence 
Management almost one year earlier (hereinafter referred to as the "ACHD proceeds "). 
In this action the Plaintiff Fullers claim that they had reserved a right in the purchase/sale 
agreement to receive the ACHD proceeds for the .99 acres that were subsequently paid to Liberty 
Partners. As the defendants in this action, both Liberty and Confluence assert that the 
purchase/sale agreement unambiguously limited the Fullers' right to the ACHD proceeds to any 
sale or condemnation that occurred prior to the Fullers' September 2005 closing on the sale of the 
12.73 acres. And that in any event, the doctrine of merger now precludes the Fullers from 
attempting to enforce a contract provision that was not reserved in the deed that has now 
superseded the underlying contract. 
Therefore, the following question is presented to this Court upon the Fullers' motion for 
partial summary judgment: 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
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Are the Plaintiff Fullers entitled to the $83,921.00 in proceeds that were paid by 
the ACHD to the Defendant Liberty Partners on or about August 10, 2006 for the 
purchase of approximately one acre of land out of the 12.73 acres of land that 
Fullers had previously sold to Liberty's assignor, Confluence Management, on or 
about September 20, 2005 for more than 1.25 million dollars? 
II. 
THE FACTUAL DISPUTE 
Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint is a copy of the September 20, 2005 real estate 
sales contract between the Fullers and Confluence Management, and its assignee Liberty 
Partners. The dispute that is before this Court arises out of the language found in paragraph 10 
of that contract, and an "addendum" to that paragraph, l also dated September 20, 2005, which in 
relevant part declares as follows: 
10. OTHER TERMS AND/OR CONDITIONS: This Agreement is made 
subject to the following special terms, considerations and/or contingencies 
which must be satisfied prior to closing ... 
3. Seller to receive any and all funds paid for road right of way 
including land, landscaping, fencing, sprinklers and temporary 
easements. 
Escrow instructions by the title company will cover the receipt and 
disbursement of the right of way funds. It is understood that buyer 
will be deeding the right of way to ACHD and that the seller, Dave 
and Shirley Fuller will receive all said funds paid by ACHD. Said 
The last sentence of paragraph 10 declares, "continues on addendum # 2." There 
is no "addendum # 2," but there is an "addendum # 1" (Exhibit B to the Amended Complaint), 
that declares, "continuation of the Earnest Money Agreement paragraph # 10." There is no 
dispute between the parties that this addendum # 1 does provide the additional language 
appended to paragraph 10, and that the reference in paragraph 10 to "addendum # 2," is simply a 
. , 
scnvener s error. 
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amount has not been yet determined and Dave and Shirley Fuller 
retain the right to negotiate the amount with ACHD. 
(Emphasis added). 
III. 
LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES RAISED 
The Fuller Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to partial summary judgment awarding 
them the ACHD proceeds because the Defendants cannot defeat that claim based upon their 
ninth affirmative defense encompassing the merger doctrine, which if applicable, would entirely 
ddeat the Fullers' claim or upon the defendants' eight affirmative defense encompassing the 
doctrine of contract novation, which would exonerate the Defendant Confluence Management 
from an liability because its rights and liabilities were entirely and completely assigned to the 
Ddendant Liberty Partners. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Sirius Le v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 156 P.3d 539 (2007) 
directly addressed the question of granting summary judgment based upon the existence of any 
genuine issue of material fact involving an affirmative defense: 
Erickson asserts that the district court improperly granted summary 
judgment with respect to his remaining twelve affirmative defenses because 
neither party raised those defenses at summary judgment. When the district court 
granted summary judgment for Sirius on the issue of consideration, it also sua 
sponte granted summary judgment with respect to Erickson's remaining defenses. 
Erickson challenged the district court's dismissal of his remaining affirmative 
defenses in his motion for reconsideration and the district court responded by 
stating that Erickson had failed to submit any evidence- affidavit, testimony, or 
otherwise - that would raise disputed issues of material fact with respect to his 
remaining defenses. 
Erickson was not required to come forth with evidence creating a 
genuine issue of material fact with regard to his remaining affirmative 
defenses at the summary judgment stage because neither party put those 
defenses at issue. While a court may grant summary judgment in favor of either 
a moving or non-moving party upon a motion for summary judgment, its 
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authority is limited to the issues placed before it pursuant to the movant's motion. 
Harwood, 136 Idaho at 677, 39 P.3d at 617. The record indicates that the only 
ground asserted by Erickson in his motion for summary judgment was the defense 
of lack of consideration. Sirius did not file its own motion for summary judgment 
and thus did not raise any additional issues. Accordingly, when the district court 
determined that summary judgment was proper with respect to Erickson's 
remaining affirmative defenses, it improperly "seized upon" matters not before it 
pursuant to the movant's motion. See Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 
Idaho 527, 531, 887 P.2d lO34, lO38 (1994) (holding that district court 
improperly seized upon the issue of proximate cause on summary judgment in 
negligence action where no argument was offered regarding this element by the 
moving party). We vacate the district court's dismissal of Erickson's remaining 
affirmative defenses because they were not at issue in the summary judgment 
proceedings. 
144 Idaho at 43, 156 P.3d at 544 (emphasis added). 
Here, the defendants in their answer to the Fullers' Amended Complaint alleged twelve 
affirmative defenses, only two of which - the eighth and ninth - have been raised and put at issue 
by the Fullers on their motion for partial summary judgment. 
A court can grant summary judgment to the non-moving party when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the non-moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677-78, 39 P.3d 612,617-18 (2001). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Fullers'" Alleged Contract Rights Have Been Superseded By The Warranty 
The essential elements that must be present to have an enforceable land sale contract 
include: (1) identification of the parties involved, (2) identification of the subject matter of the 
contract, (3) the price or consideration, (4) a legal description of the property, and (5) all the 
essential terms necessary in any particular situation that are required to form an enforceable 
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agreement. P.O. Ventures v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 238, 159 P.3d 
870, 875 (2007). 
In this case the parties included the Fullers and Confluence Management, who 
subsequently assigned all its rights as buyer under the contract to Liberty Partners. The subject 
matter of the contract was 12.73 acres of property located at 890 N. Ten Mile Road, Meridian, 
Idaho. The price for this entire property was identified as $1,273,000.00. A legal description 
was appended to both the purchase/sale agreement and the warranty deed. The purchase/sale 
agreement provided the remaining essential terms concerning the date of closing, the payment of 
the consideration, and the assignment of Confluence Management's rights to Liberty Partners. 
Under the doctrine of merger these essential terms of an enforceable land sale contract 
constitute the very terms that are merged into a subsequent deed. The Defendants in this action 
concur with the Plaintiff Fullers' statement of the merger doctrine as recently set out in Sells v. 
Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 771-72, 118 P.3d 99, 103-04 (2005), which incorporated the 
declaration of that doctrine made in, Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879 
(1966), to the effect that, 
[T]he acceptance of a deed to premises generally is considered a merger of the 
agreements of an antecedent contract into the terms of the deed, and any claim 
for relief must be based on the covenant or agreements contained in the deed, 
not the covenants or agreements as contained in the prior agreement. 
90 Idaho at 382, 414 P.2d at 884 (emphasis added). As stated in Sells, the following test is 
applied: 
H[w]here the right claimed under the contract would vary, change, or alter the 
agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the very subject-matter with which the 
deed deals, a prior contract covering the same subject-matter cannot be shown 
against the provisions of the deed. H 
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141 Idaho at 771-72, 118 P.3d at 103-04 (italicized emphasis in original). 
The Fullers do not dispute the fact that the warranty deed in this case does not incorporate 
and preserve any right in them to receive the ACHD proceeds that are at issue, and consequently 
they predicate their claim entirely upon the underlying real estate purchase/sale agreement. The 
Fullers have argued in support of their motion for partial summary judgment that the contract 
provision that they are attempting to enforce does not address matters that are inherent in the 
subject matter of the deed, such as title, possession, quantity or emblements of the land, but 
rather that the contract provision at issue it only deals with "money." See, Fullers' Summary 
Judgment Memorandum at pg. 5. 
The consideration paid, the amount of land sold, and the legal description of that land, are 
all essential elements necessary to form an enforceable land sale agreement, as declared in the 
Po. Ventures decision that was cited above. In order for this Court to decide the Fullers' claim 
to the ACHD proceeds that has been made in this case, evidence will be required that delves into 
questions of how much land was sold by the Fullers to Confluence Management (was it 12.73 
acres? or 12.73 acres minus the .99 acres that ACHD purchased?); the consideration that was 
paid (was it $1,273,000? or was it $1,273,000 minus the $83,921 in ACHD proceeds?); and the 
legally enforceable description of the property that was sold, as incorporated into the warranty 
deed. See, Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 629, 200 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009) ("A description 
contained in a deed will be sufficient so long as quantity, identity or boundaries of property can 
be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which it 
refers."). 
This application of the merger doctrine, so as to preclude evidence arising out of an 
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underlying contract that would necessarily alter the terms of the deed itself, is consistent with the 
long-standing application of the parol evidence rule to preclude the introduction of evidence that 
would alter the terms embodied within the terms of the deed itself. See e.g., Barmore v. Perrone, 
145 Idaho 340, 345, 179 P.3d 303, 308 (2008), citing to Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 898 P.2d 
1081 (1995). It is significant to the decision of this question that the ACHD itself declared in an 
October 28, 2005 letter to the Fullers that it was compelled by controlling Idaho law to negotiate 
only with the owner of record - which at that date was Liberty Partners, not the Fullers. See, 
Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Michael R. Jones. 
In sum, the merger doctrine precludes the Fullers in this case from attempting to enforce 
alleged contract rights that would necessarily change three essential elements of an enforceable 
land sale contract that are embodied within the terms of the deed itself - (1) the identification of 
the property being sold (12.73 acres, or something less), (2) the amount of consideration to be 
paid for that property ($1,273,000, or something less), and (3) the precise legal description of 
that property. Consequently, because the Fullers cannot prevail upon their claim to the ACHD 
proceeds because of the operation of the merger doctrine, not only should their motion for partial 
summary judgment be denied, but summary judgment on that claim should be entered for the 
Defendants in this action. 
B. Even If The Fullers' Contract Rights Survived Merger Into The Warranty Deed, 
Those Rights Lapsed At Closing 
As included in the statement of disputed facts set out above, the terms of the contract 
upon which the Fullers rely, as stated in paragraph 10 of the purchase/sale agreement were 
clearly and unambiguously stated as lapsing, if not exercised and satisfied prior to closing: 
This Agreement is made subject to the following special terms, considerations 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 8 
00022 
and/or contingencies which must be satisfied prior to closing . .. 
(Emphasis added). 
When the terms of a contract are unambiguous, interpretation of the contract and its legal 
effect are questions of law. Opportunity, L.L.e. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605, 38 P.3d 
1258, 1261 (2002). An unambiguous contract will be given its plain meaning, which is based on 
the words of the contract. Id. A contract must be interpreted in its entirety, without nullifying or 
ignoring any provision of that contract. Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 806, 10 P.3d 751, 755 
(CLApp.2000). 
Paragraph 26 of the purchase/sale agreement declared in bold letters that, "TIME IS OF 
THE ESSENCE IN THIS AGREEMENT." Generally, when time is made of the essence in a 
real estate sales contract, performance must occur within the prescribed time constraints 
contained in that contract. Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 134 Idaho 264, 269,1 P.3d 
292, 297 (2000); Ujdur v. Thompson, 126 Idaho 6, 9, 878 P.2d 180, 183 (CLApp.1994) 
("[W]here the parties make time of the essence in setting a deadline for payment, strict 
compliance with such deadline is required. "). 
In this case the Fullers were given an opportunity to negotiate a sale with ACHD prior to 
closing with Confluence Management. Had the Fullers been successful in their negotiations with 
ACHD then necessary adjustments could have been made in the identification of the property 
being sold, its legal description, and the consideration to be paid to be paid at closing. The facts 
are undisputed that the Fullers neither successfully completed negotiations with ACHD prior to 
closing, nor did they thereafter specifically further reserve any continuing right to conduct such 
negotiations, or to receive any further compensation from either ACHD, or Confluence 
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Management or its assigns (Liberty Partners) as the buyer, as the result of any subsequent sale to, 
or condemnation by, ACHD. 
Therefore, even if the Fullers' contract right, as embodied within paragraph 10 of the 
purchase/sale agreement, had survived merger into the deed, that contract right by its own 
unambiguous and express terms lapsed at the time of the Fullers' closing with Confluence 
Management and its assignee Liberty Partners. The Fullers no longer had any enforceable 
contract right after the date of that closing to either negotiate or receive proceeds from ACHD 
arising from any subsequent sale or condemnation of that property by ACHD. Consequently, the 
Fullers are not entitled to summary judgment on their claim to the ACHD proceeds, and because 
there are no genuine issues of material fact on this question, summary judgment should be 
entered for the Defendants in this action, as a matter of law. 
C. Confluence Management Has No Liability To The Fullers Because It Assigned All 
Of' Its Rights Arising Out Of' The Contract And Subsequent Deed to Liberty 
Partners 
The Fullers have argued in support of their motion for partial summary judgment that the 
Defendant Confluence Management is not released from any liability to them as a result of its 
assignment of its right as "buyer" under the purchase/sale agreement to Liberty Partners. In 
support of their argument the Fullers rely upon the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in George 
W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho 386, 766 P.2d 1267 (CLApp.1988), and decisions 
from Texas and Colorado. 
The lease agreement that was at issue in the Watkins case contained a provision that 
specifically declared that in the event of an assignment or sublease that, "the Lessee shall 
nevertheless not be relieved form his obligation to fully perform hereunder in the event of the 
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default of the assignee. [Underlining original.]" 115 Idaho at 390, 766 P.2d at 1271 (emphasis in 
original). Consequently, the decision rendered in the Watkins case was constrained by 
contractual language in which the lessee retained liability notwithstanding any assignment or 
sublease. Furthermore, the Fullers have made no argument to this Court that the supporting 
authority that they have cited from Texas and Colorado is consistent with existing Idaho law, or 
that this out-of-state authority has any persuasive authority as applied to controlling Idaho law. 
As applied under Idaho law, an "assignment" and a "sublease", are not synonymous terms 
that evoke an equivalent legal meaning. As the Court in Haag v. Pollack, 122 Idaho 605, 836 
P.2d 551 (CLApp. 1992) observed: 
An assignment, unlike a sublease, disposes of a lessee's entire interest in 
the leasehold, and does not reserve to the lessee any reversionary interest. 
Fahrenwald v. LaBonte, 103 Idaho 751, 753 n. 1, 653 P.2d 806, 808 n. 1 
(CLApp.1982). In other words, an assignment is a transfer of all of one's interest 
in property. See 6 AMJUR.2DAssignments 1, at 185 (1963). 
122 Idaho at 610,836 P.2d at 556. 
As applied to the facts of this case, the controlling general rule of Idaho law provides that 
when a contract is assignable, the assignee acquires all the rights and responsibilities of the 
assignor, and is thereafter substituted for the assignor. Van Berkem v. Mountain Home 
Development Co., 132 Idaho 639, 641, 977 P.2d 901, 903 (CLApp.1999), citing Anderson v. 
Carrigan, 50 Idaho 550, 555, 298 P. 673, 674 (1931). This applicable legal rule was recently 
more fully stated as follows in Foley v. Grigg, 144 Idaho 530, 164 P.3d 810 (2007): 
An assignment is a transfer of rights or property from one person to 
another. Purco Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Fin., 140 Idaho 121, 125, 
90 P.3d 346, 350 (2004) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 115 (7th ed.1999); 6 
AmJur.2d Assignment 1 (1999)). An assignment "confers a complete and 
present right in the subject matter to the assignee." Id. (quoting 6 AmJ ur.2d 
Assignment 1 (1999)). "[A]n assignee takes the subject of the assignment with 
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all the rights and remedies possessed by and available to the assignor." 6 
Am.Jur.2d Assignment 144 (1999) (emphasis added). Once an assignor makes an 
assignment, he no longer retains control of the subject of the assignment. See 
First State Bank of Eldorado v. Rowe, 142 Idaho 608, 612, 130 P.3d 1146, 1150 
(2006). 
144 Idaho at 533, 164 P.3d at 813 (italicized emphasis in original). 
Even if this Court should find that the Fullers retain a contractual right to pursue the relief 
they seek in respect to the ACHD proceeds, or that they have not lost this contractual right due to 
the doctrine of merger, no factual or legal basis exists in this case upon which they are entitled to 
pursue either the Defendant Confluence Management, or the Defendant David Callister, 
individually, inasmuch as neither of these named defendants has any enforceable legal obligation 
to the Fullers. Defendant, Callister, was not at any time pertinent to these claims acting as an 
individual and, therefore, should not be a named party in this claim. Therefore, this Court should 
deny the Fullers' motion for summary judgment in respect to the Defendants' eighth affirmative 
defense, and instead grant summary judgment for both Confluence and Callister individually, as 
to any claim made against them in this action by the Fullers. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fullers' motion for partial summary judgment should be denied. This Court should 
enter summary judgment for the defendants' as a matter of law - on the basis that the Fullers have 
no enforceable claim to the ACHD proceeds. In the event that this Court does not dismiss the 
Fullers claims in their entirety, then the Defendants Confluence, and Callister individually, 
should be dismissed due to the absence of any liability in them to the Fullers. 
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Respectfully submitted this~ day of July, 2009. 
Attorney for the Defendants 
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CASE NO. CV OC 0820018 
Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorney Fees 
COMES NOW, Defendants, Dave Callister ("Callister"), Confluence Management, 
LLC ("Confluence", and Liberty Partners, Inc. ("Liberty") by and through its attorney of 
record, Michael R. Jones, PLLC and pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l), 54(d)(5), and 54(e)(I), seeks 
an award of attorneys' fees and costs as prevailing party in the litigation. Defendants seek 
an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120(1), §12-120(3) and §12-121. 
Defendants are the prevailing party. All claims raised by Plaintiffs' Complaint were 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
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dismissed. The Complaint arose from a commercial transaction and is transaction covered 
by the attorney fee provisions of §12-120(1), §12-120(3). This Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorneys' Fees is supported by the Affidavit of Michael R. Jones in Support of 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees tiled concurrently herewith. By way of this 
Memorandum of Costs, Defendants Callister, Confluence and Liberty seek an award of 
costs as a matter of right in the amount of $244.61, discretionary costs in the amount of 
$4.95 and an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $9,010.25. 
DATED this i day of October 2009. 
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CASE NO. CV OC 0820018 
Affidavit in Support of 
Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorney Fees 
COMES NOW the Defendants, appearing by its attorney of record, Michael R. Jones of 
the firm of Michael R. Jones, PLLC, and respectfully submits to the Court this itemized list of 
costs and disbursements incurred herein pursuant to Rules 54(d), 54(e)(1), and 54(e)(5) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Affidavit of Michael R. Jones 
Support of Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorney Fees 
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STATE OF IDAHO 





I, Michael R. Jones, being duly sworn, depose and say: 
1. I am attorney of record for Dave Callister ("Callister"), Confluence 
Management, LLC ("Confluence"), and Liberty Partners, Inc. ("Liberty") the Defendants in 
the above-entitled matter, and I make this affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge. 
2. I have over thirty years of legal experience. I am familiar with the hourly rates 
charged by attorneys in this area and certify that the following attorney time and hourly rates 
charged in this matter were reasonable and necessary for this case, as were the costs incurred 
herein, and further certify that the costs claimed are reasonable and necessary, and that any 
discretionary costs claimed were necessary and exceptional. 
3. The following are the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by Defendants 
attributable to their defense of the claims brought by Plaintiffs against Defendants. In 
preparing this Affidavit, I have combined the time incurred in defense of all the Defendants. 
Only a few hours of time my research time for the summary judgment opposition was 
allocated soley to Defendant Callister in defense of his individual liability and again for the 
novation issues related to Confluence. 
4. The attorneys' fees incurred are as follows: 
Attorney 
Michael R. Jones 




















The amount claimed is based upon an evaluation of all the time spent on this case. The 
attorney fees charged to Defendants are set forth on Exhibit A and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
5. The following are the costs which are recoverable as a matter of right pursuant 
to Rule 54(d)(I)(c): 
Court Filing Fees: 
Deposition Transcript Fees 
Deposition of Dave Callister 
Affidavit of Michael R. Jones 
Support of Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorney Fees 







6. The following are the costs Defendants incurred in obtaining copies of 
documents from the Ada County Highway District that were used in defense of the lawsuit and 
in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. The photocopy costs are 
recoverable in the Court's discretion under Rule 54(d)(l)(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The amount of claimed discretionary costs is the amount of $4.95. 
7. In total, Defendants claim costs as a matter of right and attorneys fees in the 
amount of $244.61, discretionary fees in the amount of $4.95 and attorney fees in the amount of 
$9,010.25. The total amount claimed for all costs and attorney fees is the sum of $9,259.81. 
MICHAEL R. JO~9JLLC 
d?~*-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ of October 2009. 
DATED this 1 day of October 2009. 
04lT1ctJ fAJ Il~ 
N ry ublic, State of-Idaho 
Residing at 60~ ~0J 
My Commission Expires: ~ d-A., cJV\.l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1, the undersigned, certify that on the ~ day of October, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the 
methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, to the 
following person(s): 
E. Don Copple 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & 
COPPLE 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 
600 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise Idaho 83701 
Affidavit of Michael R. Jones 
Support of Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorney Fees 
U.S. Mail 
Certified Mail-Return Receipt requested 
)rFax - 208-386-9428 
By Hand 
Overnight 
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Client: 229 Liberty Partners, Inc. 
Michael R. Jones PLLC 
Work-in-Progress 
To Oct 8/2009 
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1 7 577 
Nov 12/2008 
17578 
La~yer: mrj 0.20 Hrs X 185.00 
Telephone call with client regarding 
suit filed by Fullers. 
~a~Jer: mrj 0 50 Hrs X 185.00 
Telephone call with client and receipt 
and review of documents. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.05 Hrs X 185.00 
Telephone call with client left 
message to call. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.10 Hrs X "i85.00 
Telephone call with client regarding 
strategy and fees. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.75 Hrs X 185.00 
Telephone call and message to 
plaintiffs' counsel EG regarding 
appearance and prepare notice of 
appearance and draft letter and email 
to plaintiffs' counsel. 
La~yer: mrj 0.50 Hrs X 185.00 
Telephone call with plaintiffs' 
counsel regarding case and settlement 
potential; Telephone call with olient 
regarding conversation with counsel and 
ema~l regarding clarifications to 
stelt'"S of develcpment and property for 
sale. 
18/2G08 Lawyer: mrj 0.50 Hrs X 185.00 
17580 Telephone call with plaintiffs' 
Jee 20/2008 
17584 
counsel regarding case and rejection of 
settlement: Telephone call with client 
regarding conversation with counsel. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.60 Hrs X 185.00 
Preparati~n of offer of 
compromise/settlement. 
Lawyer: mrj 3.50 Hrs X 185.00 
?reparation of draft answer to 
complaint. 
Lawyer: mrj 2.00 Hrs X 185.00 
Review of varioGs sales agreements and 
drafting answer and Telephone call with 
c~~ent regarding answer and settlement 
offer. 
Lawyer: mrj 1.20 Hrs X 185.00 
Drafting affirmative defenses: 
authority of president in individual 
capacity. 
Clerk of District Court 
Answer and Counterclaim 
Dec 22/2C08 La~rfer: mrj 1.00 Hrs X 185.00 
Review final answer with client. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.50 Hrs X 200.00 










regarding purchase and sale matters. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.50 Hrs X 200.00 
Telephone call with ACRO 
representatives regarding record review 
and request to see records. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.10 Hrs X 200.00 
cail with ACHD 
representative regarding time to come 
and review records. 
Ada County Highway District 
Lawyer: mrj 3 75 Hrs X 200 00 
Review of records at ACHD travel to 
ACHD. 
La~/er: ~rj 1.20 Hrs X 200.00 
Preparation of scheduling stipulation 
and Telephone call with plaintiff's 
counsel EG. Make corrections to 
stipulatio~ forward to plaintiffs' 
counsel. Fax stipulation to Court and 
Telephone call with Judge Wilper's 
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EG regarding hearing vacated. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.20 Hrs X 200.00 
Telephcne call with client regarding 
status and plan of defense. 
Lawyer: DF 3.50 Hrs X 85.00 
Legal Research Idaho and case law of 
merger officers and directors personal 
liability. 
;:.awyer: DF 2.25 Hrs X 85.00 
Legal Research elements of novation 
and wai'v'·er. 
Lav.yer: mrj 0.30 Hrs X 200.00 
Telephone call with client regarding 
discovery responses. 
La'tlyer: mrj 0.60 Hrs X 200.00 
Telephone call with First American 
Title and counsel; Telephone call with 
client's realtor. Review of discovery 
!:'esponses. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.30 Hrs X 200.00 
Correspondence to plaintiffs' counsel 
EG regarding deposition of Dave 
Callister. 
Lal<yer: mrj 2.75 Hrs X 200.00 
Drafting Defendants First set of 
discovery of plaintiffs. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.05 Hrs X 200.00 
Email to plaintiffs' counsel regarding 
Callister deposition 
La*ye:: mrj 0.20 Hrs X 200.00 
ema:ls regarding depositions and 
Telephone call with client regarding 
deposition schedules. 
Lawye:: mrj 3.25 Hrs X 200.00 
Attendance at deposition of David 
Callister. 
f~ & i'i Court Reporting 
Deposition David Callister 
Lawyer: mrj 1.20 Hrs X 200.00 
Review of pleadings and deposition and 
discovery. 
2:.awyer: gary 2.80 Hrs X 150.00 
Legal Research and review of cases 
cited by plaintiff in motion for 
sU:Emary judgement memo. 
Lawyer: gary 3.30 Hrs X 150.00 
Drafting response memorandum to 
summary judgement motion. 
Lawyer: mrj 3.80 Ers X 200.00 
Drafting memorandum and affidavit of 
counsel and research issue of novation. 
La~jer: mrj 1.50 Hrs X 200.00 
Drafting and final review of 
memora.ndum. 
Lawyer: mrj 1. 00 Hrs X 200.00 
Review of plaintiffs' reply brief. 
Lawyer: mrj 4.00 Hrs X 200.00 
Preparation for hearing and attend 
hearing on motion for summary 
judgement; email to client regarding 
hearing. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.50 Hrs X 200.00 
Conference with appraiser regarding 
being expert witness for defense. 
Lawyer: mrj 0.75 Hrs X 200.00 
Review of court memorandum decision 
and email to client. 
Lawyer: mrj 1.50 Hrs X 200.00 
Prepare proposed final judgement and 
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Boise, Idaho 83701 
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DA VE CALLISTER, an individual, 
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CASE NO.: CV OC 0820018 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION 
TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, David and Shirley Fuller, by and through their attorneys of 
record, Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, and hereby submits this memorandum with the 
foregoing case authority and legal arguments in support of their Motion. 
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I. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Did Not Defend This Lawsuit Frivolously, 
Unreasonably or Without Foundation. 
Idaho Code § 12-121 grants the court discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party. Attorney fees are awarded under this section only if the position advocated by 
the nonprevailing party was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7,121 P.3d 938 (2005); see also, 
Associates iV. W v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 (Ct.App.1987) and Jerry J Joseph c.L. U. 
Ins. Assocs. V Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct.App.1990) . 
Rule 54( e)(1) and (e )(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure have supplemented Idaho 
Code § 12-121 and requires the court to make a written finding, either in the award or a separate 
document as to the basis and reasons for award such fees. Need v. Idaho State Dep '[ of Cor., 115 
Idaho 399, 766 P.2d 1280 (Ct.App.1988). 
Rule 54( e)( 1) entitled attorney fees of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or 
parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(I)(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be 
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the 
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation; but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section 12-121, 
Idaho Code, on a default judgment. 
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against Defendants on their affirmative defenses 
of the doctrine of merger and novation and that Defendant Confluence Management breached its 
contractual agreement with Plaintiffs for failing and refusing to turn over the condemnation 
proceeds pursuant to their agreement providing for a reservation of the ACHD condemnation 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
00040 
proceeds that all parties had actual knowledge that ACHD sought to condemn a portion of the 
land prior to execution of the agreement. The primary fact was that the reservation of the 
condemnation proceeds which was clear and unambiguous in the agreement. 
Plaintiffs provided legal support of their position from other jurisdictions that held a 
reservation of the condemnation proceeds provided under a valid agreement was enforceable. 
Those same jurisdictions also adhered to principles set forth in the doctrine of merger. 
Ddcndants provided no case authority to the contrary. 
This Court held as a matter of law that a reservation of condemnation proceeds in the 
agreement was a .. term is the right of alienation of the property" and therefore the doctrine of 
merger applies. 1 
Plaintiffs also cited authority from Idaho and other jurisdictions defining and 
distinguishing the distinct legal theories of novation and assignment. In the instant case, 
Plaintiffs merely consented to Defendants Confluence and Liberty Partners assignment, but did 
not execute any document releasing Confluence of its obligations and liability under the 
agreement. Defendants provided the Court the law on an assignment which Plaintiffs did not 
dispute governed that theory under [daho law. The Court held that the assignment transferred 
Confluence's rights over to Liberty Partners and denied Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the 
novation defense. 
Although the Court disagreed with the case authority cited by Plaintiffs in support of their 
motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss two of Defendants' affirmative defenses, it is 
evident from the record that Plaintiffs did not bring, pursue or defend this case frivolously, 
I Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 4. 
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unreasonably and without foundation in law of fact. 
Simply because a Court disagrees with the application and interpretation of cited case 
authority to the facts of a case does not render the pursuit or defense of such proposition 
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. Otherwise, in all cases the party who is on the 
other side of the Court's decision either brought, pursued or defended the case frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation and an award of attorney fees would be mandatory, contrary 
to 1.R.c.P. 54(e)(l) and Idaho Code § 12-121 provides. 
Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Court find that they did not bring, pursue or 
defend this lawsuit frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. There was no dispute of 
fact that Liberty Partners was aware of the reservation of the condemnation proceeds, accepted 
the condemnation proceeds and converted the proceeds for its benefit.2 
B. Defendants' are not entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(1) or (3). 
Defendants seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(1), (3) and 
12-121 and Rule 54( e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The latter premises are 
addressed above and will not be reiterated. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(1) applies to civil actions plead for $25,000 or less. In the instant 
case, Plaintiffs pled for damages over $83,000 that was taken by Defendants, therefore rendering 
this section inapplicable for an award of attorney fees. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) reads in pertinent part: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
:2 The record reflected that Dave Callister was a member and sole shareholder of both Confluence Management, 
LLC and Liberty Partners, Inc. 
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goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes ... 
Defendants allege that they incurred attorneys' fees in the amount of $9,0 1 0.25 in this 
case. It is alleged that the firm of Michael R. Jones, PLLC expended a total of 50.70 hours for 
both its clients in defending this action. See Affidavit of Michael R. Jones, p. 2. 
Under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), the Court must determine that the gravamen of the case 
involves a "commercial transaction" and which party was the "prevailing party." 
"A two-prong test exists for awarding attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). First, an 
alleged commercial transaction must be integral to the claim. Second, the commercial 
transaction must be the basis upon which a party is attempting to recover." Andrea v. City (~l 
Coeur D'Alene, 132 Idaho 188, 190, 968 P.2d 1097 (App.1998). 
In Bastian v. Albertson's. Inc .. 102 Idaho 909, 643 P.2d 1079 (App.1982), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals aHirmed the district court's denial of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-
120(2) \\hich is now Idaho Code § 12-120(3) contending that said provision, on its face, was not 
applicable to the dispute between the tenant and landlord under the lease agreement. See also, 
Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc., v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 978 P.2d 233 (1999). 
In the instant case, the issue related to whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to ACHD 
condemnation proceeds incorporated and reserved in the addendum of the agreement. The 
PlaintitTs sold their personal residence and land to Defendants Callister and Confluence 
tvlanagement, LLC. The reservation of the condemnation proceeds was not an integral 
commercial transaction contemplated by Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Rather, the reservation of the 
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condemnation proceeds went to the purchase price of the real property sold to Defendants. 
Because the claim asserted by Plaintiffs did not involve a commercial transaction as 
contemplated by the provision, Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and therefore Defendants request for attorney fees must be denied. 
C. Defendants' Request For $9,010.25 As Attornev Fees Is Excessive And Unreasonable. 
If the Court finds that the issue involved was a commercial transaction, then in 
determining the prevailing party, the Court's examination involves a three part inquiry: 1) the 
result obtained in relation to the relief sought; 2) whether there were multiple issues or claims; 
and 3) the extent to which either party prevailed on each issue and claim. Joseph CL. U Ins. 
Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 557 (App. 1990). 
What constitutes a reasonable attorney fee is a discretionary determination for the trial 
court, to be guided by the criteria of LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 326, 
1 P.3d 823 (App.2000). "This amount may be more or less than the sum which the prevailing 
party is obligated to pay its attorney under their agreement." See id. 
"A court is permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by 
the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the 
attorney ... An attorney cannot 'spend' his time extravagantly and expect to be compensated by 
the party who loses at trial." Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho 259, 263, 999 
P.2d 914 (App.2000) (quoting Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 
P.2d 324, 326 (Ct.App.1985». "Hence, a court may disallow fees that were unnecessarily and 
unreasonably incurred or that were the product of attorney 'churning.'" Id. 
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) sets forth criteria for which the Court must consider in determining 
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what is a reasonable fee to be awarded. The factors include time and labor required; novelty and 
difficulty of the issues; skill and experience of counsel; prevailing charges for like work; whether 
fee is fixed or contingent; amount involved and results obtained; undesirability of case; awards in 
similar cases and several others. 
In the instant case and assuming a commercial transaction was involved, PlaintifTs do not 
dispute that Defendants prevailed in light of the fact this Court entered summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants in its entirety. 
However, Plaintiffs do dispute and challenge the reasonableness of the attorney fees 
allegedly incurred by Defendants and contend that the fees incurred by Defendants are excessive 
in light of the time and work performed in this case by counsel of all the parties involved in this 
matter. 
In reviewing the time records submitted by affidavit, a careful examination of said 
records show that counsels' time was excessive, duplicate and unreasonable for work performed 
for certain items. 
The principal issue involved in this case was whether the reservation of the condemnation 
proceeds in the addendum was breached by Defendants for failing to turn-over the proceeds. It 
was undisputed that Defendants accepted the condemnation proceeds and failed to forvvard the 
proceeds to Plaintiffs per the terms of the agreement. The issue was identical for all Defendants 
and \vork performed by its counsel was same tor all Defendants. Defendants, jointly, 
propounded only one set of discovery requests, no depositions were taken by Defendants and the 
matter was resolved in summary judgment by the Court. All in all, Defendants contend that its 
counsel incurred a total of 50.70 hours of time spent in detending this case on their behalf. 
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Counsel for Plaintiffs has broken down the fees and time spent that they contend was 
excessive, unreasonable and/or duplicate work performed. 
According to the time entries, Defendants' counsel, Michael Jones, expended 7.70 hours 
at $185 per hour preparing, drafting, discussing and finalizing Defendants' Answer to the 
lawsuit.3 
The facts were fairly simple and mostly undisputed and the doctrine of merger was the 
only affirmative defense that had any legal merit. The remaining defenses were boilerplate 
defenses with only a scintilla of evidence in support thereof. 
The preparation of the answer for two causes of actions being asserted should have taken 
less than half of the time Defendants allege was incurred. Although some time should have been 
incurred to respond to the Complaint, three (3) hours would have been reasonable to prepare the 
Ansvver Defendants' filed. 
On January 13,2009, Defendants counsel alleges he incurred 3.75 hours at $200 per hour 
for traveling and reviewing records at ACHD. Plaintiffs' claim that this entry is excessive and 
unreasonable on the grounds that Defendants could have obtained the same information under a 
Freedom of Information request at substantially less expense than counsel incurred and the same 
information was provided by Plaintiffs' in response to Defendants first and only set of discovery. 
A letter should have been prepared that at most should have taken twenty (20) minutes or 
.33 hours, if that, to prepare the request for the information. 
On February 6 and 7, 2009, Doug Fleenor expended 5.75 hours at $85 per hour 
performing legal research on the doctrine of merger, otlicer's personal liability, elements of 
3 See AlT. of Jones, Exhibit A, entries dated December 18,19,20, and 23, 2008. 
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novation and waiver. 
On June 29 and July 2, 2009, Gary Quigley expended 6.10 hours at $150 per hour 
reviewing cases cited by Plaintiffs in their memorandum and preparing a response memorandum 
to the PlaintitTs' motion. 
On July 3 and 6, 2009, Michael Jones expended 5.3 hours drafting and finalizing the 
memorandum, preparing a 2 page af1idavit attaching 3 exhibits and researching the issue of 
novation (\vhich Defendants cited no case authority on the issue). 
Defendants did not file a counter motion for summary judgment nor raised or presented 
any evidence in the record on Defendant Callister's personal liability which this Court granted. 
In all, the submission of one brief: including legal research performed. and a 2 page 
aftidavit in response to the motion for partial summary judgment allegedly entailed 13.65 hours 
between the counsel. 
Interestingly, Defendants agreed on Plaintiffs' representation on the law of merger in 
Idaho and cited no other authority to the contrary on the specific issue. Furthermore. Defendants 
cited no case authority on the issue of novation, but provided the Court authority on an 
assignment. 
PlaintifTs respectfully request the Court reduce the alleged time expended by the counsel 
in preparing Defendants' response to the motion for partial summary judgment to a reasonable 
amount of time of 9 hours. 
For the reasons and arguments set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the 
Court reduce the total hours expended by Michael Jones as follows: 
1) 10.90 hours @ $185/hr. to 6.20 hours @ $185/hr. for a total 01'$1,147.00; and 
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, . . 
2) 27.95 hours@ $200/hr. to 19.88 hours @$200/hr. for a total 0[$3,976.00. 
In total. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the total amount of the fees allegedly incurred 
be reduced trom $9.010.25 to $6,526.75 based upon the reasons and arguments set forth above. 
D. Costs 
The only cost that Plaintiffs' dispute is the discretionary costs of $4.95 for photocopies of 
ACED documents as those costs were not exceptional costs reasonably incurred and in the 
interest of justice should not be assessed against Plaintiffs. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintitls respectfully request that the Court deny 
Defendants request for attorney fees for failing to state a provision authorizing the Court to 
award attorney fees and award only those costs as a matter of right. 
In the alternative. PlaintitTs request the Court enter its order reducing the Defendants 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees to a total amount of $6,771.36. 
DATED this 21 sl day of October, 2009. 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE, LLP 
By:~~~~~~~~~~~ _____ ___ 
ED GUERR CABEITIA, of the firm 
Attorneys for PlaintiiTs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21 st day of October, 2009 a true and correct original of 
the foregoing was served upon the following by the method indicated below: 
Michael R. Jones 
Michael R. Jones PLLC 
508 North 13th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
/U.S.MAIL 
__ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile Transmission: 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
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Michael R. Jones 
MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7743 
508 North 13th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 385-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 389-9103 
ISB No. 2221 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a ) 






DA VE CALLISTER, an individual, ) 
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, ) 
an Idaho limited liability company, and ) 




CASE NO. CV OC 0820018 
DEFENDANTS= REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFFS= MEMORANDUM TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES 
COMES NOW the Defendants in the above-captioned action, by and through their counsel 
of record, Michael R. Jones, and submits the following Reply to the Plaintiffs' Memorandum to 
Disallow Costs and Attorney fees. 
1. Entitlement. Although alternative statutory grounds were stated for an award of 
attorney fees to the prevailing party defendants in this action, that statute which most clearly 
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applies is I.e. §12-120(3) providing an award in a claim arising out of a commercial transaction. 
In Heritage Excavation, Inc. v. Briscoe, 141 Idaho 40, 105 P.3d 700 (CLApp.2005) the Court 
followed the relatively long-standing precedent to grant attorney fees to the prevailing party under 
I.e. § 12-120(3) in litigation involving contracts to purchase real estate. The Court held as 
follows: 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously concluded that the test for 
application of this statute is whether a commercial transaction comprises the 
gravamen of the lawsuit; that is, whether the commercial transaction is integral to 
the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. 
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 776,890 P.2d 714,727 (1995). In Farm Credit 
Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 274-75, 869 P.2d 1365, 1369-70 
(1994) the Idaho Supreme Court held that a transaction to finance the purchase of 
real property which was intended to be used for commercial farming operations 
was a commercial transaction under I.e. § 12-120(3). We conclude that 
litigation regarding the existence of a contract to purchase real property for 
the purpose of a housing development likewise falls under I.e. §12-120(3). 
Accordingly, Briscoe as the prevailing party is awarded his attorney fees. 
141 Idaho at 40, 105 P.3d at 705 (emphasis added). The Defendants in this action were 
purchasing the Fuller property for use in their commercial real estate development activities, 
which falls squarely within the scope of activities constituting "commercial transactions," in the 
just-cited Briscoe decision. 
The opinion in Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 102 Idaho 909, 643 P.2d 1079 (CLApp.1982), 
upon which the Plaintiffs Fuller rely in opposing an award of attorney fees to the defendants under 
I.e. § 12-120(3), was decided before the "commercial transaction" language was added to that 
statute in 1986, and thus it no longer stands for the proposition cited under existing law. This fact 
was noted by the Court of the Appeals in Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 900 P.2d 201 
(Ct.App. 1995): 
In resisting this request for attorney fees, the Herricks rely upon Bastian v. 
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Albertson's, Inc., 102 Idaho 909, 915, 643 P.2d 1079,1085 (CLApp. 1982), where 
we said that Section 12-120 was inapplicable to a lease of real property. This 
reliance is misplaced, for the Bastian decision was rendered before a 1986 
amendment to Section 12-120 which added the provision mandating attorney fees 
in actions arising out of commercial transactions. 1986 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 205 
at 511-12. A transaction for commercial farming operations was found to be a 
"commercial transaction" under I.e. § 12-120(3) in Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. 
Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 275, 869 P.2d 1365, 1370 (1994). 
127 Idaho at 306, 900 P.2d at 214. 
The Defendants, as the prevailing parties in this action, are entitled to an award of attorney 
fees under I.e. §12-120(3), in accordance with the authority cited above in the Briscoe decision. 
On that basis the Defendants will not further pursue the justification for an award of attorney fees 
under either I.C. §12-120(l), or I.e. §12-121. 
2. Right to Discretionary Costs 
The Plaintiffs object to the Defendants request for $4.95 in discretionary costs. This 
amount, on its face, appears so insignificant that it should not merit further argument. But in this 
case, because this claim also relates to the general allegation made by the Fullers that the amount 
of attorney fees requested by the defendants is unreasonable, it does merit some further discussion. 
The Defendants made discovery requests to the Fullers for the documents in their 
possession concerning the ACHD condemnation of the property that the Fullers had sold to 
Liberty Partners, the proceeds of which sale was the primary issue in this action. The requested 
ACHD documents included correspondence, appraisals, memoranda, and the like. The Fullers 
responded by refusing to disclose the documents in their possession and instead simply stating that 
these documents were equally accessible to the defendants directly from ACHD. 
A party in this circumstance is confronted with the option of either going to the effort and 
cost of filing a motion to compel, and going to hearing on that motion, or simply going to ACHD 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES -- PAGE 3 
00052 
and obtaining the requested documents. The defendants in this instance opted for the latter course 
of action. 
ACHD had informed counsel that it had about 15 bankers boxes of documents concerning 
the entire 1O-mile road condemnations, of which the Fullers' property was only a very small part. 
In total, it took nearly four hours to review the documents related to the Fullers' property after they 
were located by ACHD Counsel for Defendants had to identify those relevant to this case, ask that 
they be copied, and then retrieve those copies. The total copying cost was $4.95 which is the 
discretionary cost claim that is at issue here. 
Among the documents located in the ACHD records was the October 28, 2005 letter to the 
Fullers from ACHD in which ACHD declared that it was compelled by controlling Idaho law to 
negotiate only with the owner of record -- which at that date was Liberty Partners, not the Fullers. 
This letter was attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Michael R. Jones, submitted in opposition 
to the Fullers' motion for summary jUdgment, and was one of the critical pieces of evidence that 
led to this Court's decision in this case denying the Fullers' claim to the ACHD condemnation 
proceeds. 
Under these circumstances, the imposition of this $4.95 copying cost, as a direct result of 
the Fullers refusal to comply with a reasonable and limited discovery request, was exceptional, 
necessary, and reasonable, and this $4.95should be awarded to the Defendants as a discretionary 
cost. 
3. Reasonableness of the Fees Claimed 
The Fullers request an overall reduction of almost a third (27%) in the attorney fees 
claimed from $9,010.25 to $6,526.75, or a reduction of $2,483.50. 
As already noted above in respect to the discretionary costs, the Fullers have objected to 
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the Defendants' claims for 3.75 hours to search for, and obtain documents from ACHD. They 
argue that instead these documents could have been obtained by simply writing a letter and 
requesting the documents under the Public Records Act, I.e. §9-338, for which only a charge of 
.33 hours would be appropriate. To begin with, the availability of records by an alternative means 
is not reason to allow a party to avoid or shirk its responsibilities under the discovery rules. As 
already noted above, the easiest avenue to obtain these records would have been for the Fullers to 
simply comply with the Defendants' discovery request, which they did not. Second, the Idaho 
Public Records Act only creates a right to inspect and copy, not a right to compel any agency to 
devote its staff time to answering such a request. Agencies are allowed to charge for time 
expended in locating and copying records. I.e. §9-338(8). Under these circumstances the costs 
incurred were reasonable and necessary. 
The Fullers also contest the amount of time expended in answering the complaint, and 
researching and writing the response to their summary judgment complaint. Specifically they 
object to the 7.70 hours spent by Michael Jones in "preparing, drafting, discussing, and finalizing" 
the answer. There is more involved than the mere drafting of an answer to a complaint. This 
time includes consultation with the client, analysis of the claims made, review of client documents 
and the determination of relevant affirmative defenses. While the Fullers desire that the 
Defendants had only expended three hours on these tasks is understandable, the fact that additional 
time was spent did result in the pleading of the affirmative defenses that led to a successful 
determination of this case for the defendants. In the context of the real estate transaction itself, 
the related ACHD condemnation, the challenge to the assignment between Confluence and 
Liberty, and the other related legal issues, the expenditure of 7.70 hours appears to be rather 
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economical and should be awarded in its entirety. 
The Fullers also object to a total of 5.75 hours spent conducting research at a rate of $85 per 
hour on the defense theories of merger, officer liability, novation, and waiver. This activity was 
detailed to a lower-billing individual and required the examination of the case law cited by the 
Plaintiff Fullers and the identification, review, and development of the legal argument in 
opposition to the Fullers' claims. In opposing the assignment between Confluence and Liberty, 
the Fullers attempted to adapt the specialized law that applies between lessors, lessees, and 
sub-lessees to the factual situation in this case that involved no lessors or lessees. Such 
allegations by the Fullers required the defendants to expend additional time to examine the Fullers' 
unconventional theories, and to determine their inapplicability, and to identify the appropriate 
rules that should otherwise be applied to the facts of this case. In this context 5.75 hours does not 
appear to be at all excessive. 
In total, counsel that worked on the summary judgment briefing expended 13.65 hours in 
reviewing the Fullers' motion, memorandum, and supporting authority; and in researching and 
reviewing opposing authority, drafting the memorandum, and applying the law to the facts. 
Significant legal issues involving merger, novation, and assignment were involved in this case. 
The expenditure of that amount of time is not at all extraordinary or unreasonable in the context of 
the factual questions that were at issue, in developing the record, in identifying the law, in applying 
the law to the facts, and drafting and revising the memorandum. Consequently, the Defendants 
should be awarded the full amount of time claimed. 
In total, it is not at all apparent, based upon the factual and legal issues raised and 
addressed, and the result obtained, that the Fullers have identified any area where the time 
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expended by the defendants was at all extravagant, unnecessary, redundant, or unrelated to this 
case. In the context of the prevailing charges for similar work, and in obtaining a similar result, 
the charges for costs and attorney's fees as claimed by the defendants are entirely reasonable and 
justified and should be awarded in their entirety, as claimed. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of November, 2009. 
Attorney for the Defendants. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 6th day of November, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES upon the plaintiffs by the method indicated and 
addressed as follows: 
E. DON COPPLE [ 
ED GUERRICABEITIA [ 
DA VISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE [ ] 
Attorneys at Law [ X ] 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 [ ] 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1583 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Email: guerricabetitia@davisoncopple.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC iiRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




DAVE CALLISTER, an individual, 
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, an 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, and 
LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0820018 
ORDER ON COSTS AND FEES 
This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Defendants' Costs 
and Attorney Fees and Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Decision on Attorney Fees and Costs Pending 
Appeal. The Court heard oral arguments on the motions on November 9, 2009. Ed Guerricabeitia 
appeared for the Plaintiffs and Michael R. Jones appeared for the Defendants. The Court took the 
matters fully under advisement at that time. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs owned a parcel of real property in Ada County. Plaintiffs were in the process of 
negotiating with the Ada County Highway District (ACHD) on reasonable compensation for certain 
easement rights or a fee of a portion of the property via eminent domain. On September 20, 2005, 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Confluence Management LLC (Confluence) entered into a 
Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement. That same day, Plaintiffs and 
Defendant Confluence signed an Addendum to the Purchase and Sale Agreement. Plaintiffs did not 




























complete negotiations with ACHD prior to transferring the property under the purchase and sale 
agreement. On September 22, 2005, Plaintiffs and Defendants signed another addendum which 
assigned certain rights to Defendant Liberty Partners. Defendant Callister is both a member of 
Confluence and the President of Liberty Partners. Also on September 22, 2005, Plaintiffs executed a 
warranty deed transferring the property to Liberty Partners. It is undisputed that the warranty deed 
does not contain the language of the first addendum. On August 10, 2006, Liberty Partners executed 
a Sale and Purchase Agreement and warranty deed which transferred approximately one twelfth of 
the property to ACHD. On August 25, 2006, ACHD paid Liberty Partners $83,921.00 for the 
smaller segment of the property. Plaintiffs seek the ACHD proceeds under the language of the 
Addendum. 
On August 24, 2009, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order granting 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that the contract had merged with the warranty 
deed. l On September 28,2009, the Court entered Judgment against the Plaintiffs dismissing Count 
One and Count Two of the Complaint. On October 9, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal and 
Defendants filed a memorandum and an affidavit for costs and fees. 
MOTION TO STAY DECISION ON ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS PENDING APPEAL 
Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b )(9) provides the District Court the express authority to "make any 
order regarding the taxing of costs or determination of attorneys fees incurred in the trial of an 
action" during the pendency of an appeal. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure lea) sets the standard for 
1 The August 24,2009 Order also denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Defendants' 
ninth afflrmative defense based on merger of the contract with the warranty deed. 



























resolution of suits in Idaho, "These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to enter an order staying a decision on an award of costs or attorney 
fees due to the "novelty of the issues presented in this case" and seeking to prevent this court from 
"wast[ing] time and effort for naught on the tedious and detailed task of reviewing the claimed costs 
and attorney fees." Plaintiffs have not alleged good cause or hardship as a basis to stay a decision on 
attorney fees and costs. The Court finds that judicial economy and the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
resolution of this action require the Court to undertake the cost and fee analysis at this time. 
Plaintiffs' motion to stay is DENIED. 
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(1 )(A) states that a prevailing party shall be awarded 
costs, unless otherwise provided by the Court or limited by the Rules. "The determination of which 
party is the prevailing party for purpose of awarding costs is within the discretion ofthe trial court." 
JR. Simplot Co. W Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 584, 977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999). Rule 
54( d)(1 )(B) lists the factors that this Court must consider in ruling on which party is the prevailing 
party as follows: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the 
trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the 
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there were 
multiple claims, multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or 
other mUltiple or cross issues between the parties, and the extent to which each party 
prevailed upon each of such issue or claims. The trial court in its sound discretion 
may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, 
and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair 
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the 
action and the resultant judgment or jUdgments obtained. 



























As Defendants sought the dismissal of both of Plaintiffs' claims and the Court dismissed 
both claims, Defendants are the prevailing party. Plaintiffs have not objected to the costs as a matter 
of right claimed by Defendants. Defendants seek costs of $186.61, for a deposition transcript, and 
$58.00, for the filing fee. These fall squarely within Rule 54(d)(1)(C). The Court awards $244.61 to 
Defendants as costs as a matter of right. 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(I)(D) commits the decision whether to award certain 
costs to the discretion of the trial court. Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681, 689, 39 P.3d 621, 
629 (2001). When an objection to discretionary costs is presented, the trial court "shall make 
express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be 
allowed." LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). Thus, the Court must make specific findings that each discretionary 
cost was 1) necessary, 2) exceptional, 3) reasonably incurred, and 4) should be assessed against the 
adverse party in the interest of justice. Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 422, 432, 18 P.3d 227, 237 (Ct. 
App. 2001); Swallow v. Emergency Med. o/Idaho, PA, 138 Idaho 539, 67 P.3d 68 (2003). 
Defendants seek $4.95 for costs incurred in obtaining documents from ACHD. At oral 
argument Defendants asserted that they are entitled to this cost as Plaintiffs were in possession of 
the infonnation but declined to provide it and thereby forced Defendants to incur the expense of 
obtaining it. Plaintiffs argue that such an expense is not exceptional. 
The Court finds that neither Defendants' memorandum of costs and fees nor Defendants' 
affidavit of costs and fees asserts that this cost was necessary, exceptional, or reasonably incurred. 
Further, the Court finds that the cost was not necessary and exceptional as Defendants had the 

























option of moving to compel discovery of the document or information. Plaintiffs' motion to 
disallow Defendants' claimed discretionary cost is GRANTED. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants seek an award of $9010.25 in attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-
120(1), 12-120(3), and 12-121. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are not entitled to an award of 
attorney fees under Idaho law and that the claimed attorney fees are excessive and unreasonable. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(1) provides for attorney's fees in civil actions where the amount pled is 
twenty-five thousand dollars or less. In the case at hand Plaintiffs sought $83,921.00, the amount 
paid by ACHD to Defendants. Defendants are not entitled to recover attorney fees under § 12-
120(1). 
Attorney fees may be awarded under § 12-121 only when the Court finds, from the facts 
presented, "that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." LR.C.P. 54(e)(I). That Plaintiffs may have intended to reserve the ACHD 
condemnation proceeds could be inferred from their execution of multiple documents. Although the 
Court ruled for Defendants, holding that the purchase and sale agreement merged with the warranty 
deed, the Court does not find the case was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Defendants are not entitled to recover attorney fees under § 12-121. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides in pertinent part: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable 
instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided 
by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by 
the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
25 transactions for personal or household purposes. 
26 
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1 "Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.e. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial 
2 
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to 
3 
recover." Brower v. E.I DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345,349 (1990). 
4 
"[A]n 'award of attorney's fees is not warranted [under I.C. § 12-120(3)] every time a commercial 
5 
6 
transaction is remotely connected with the case. '" Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 
7 Idaho 657, 663, 962 P.2d 1041, 1047 (1998)(quoting Brower, 117 Idaho at 784, 792 P.2d at 349). In 
8 the instant case, the transaction giving rise to the litigation was the purchase by Defendants of 
9 Plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs sought to recover condemnation proceeds. That Defendants may have 
10 
purchased the property for commercial purposes is not integral to the claim or constitute the basis 
11 
on which Plaintiffs were attempting to recover. The Court finds that this was not a commercial 
12 
transaction. Plaintiffs' motion to disallow attorney fees is GRANTED. 
13 
14 
Because the Court finds that Idaho law does not provide for an award of attorney fees in this 
15 instance, the Court does not reach the issue of the reasonability of the claimed attorney fees. 
16 
17 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
18 3r t-
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Michael R. Jones, PLLC 
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Michael R. Jones 
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P.O. Box 7743 
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Attorney for Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a ) 
married couple, ) CASE NO. CV OC 0820018 
) 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants/ ) NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 
Cross-Respondents ) 
) Class: LA. 
vs. ) Fee: $10 1.00 
) 
DA VE CALLISTER, an individual, ) 
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, ) 
an Idaho limited liability company, and ) 





TO: THE ABOVE NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, DAVID AND SHIRLEY 
FULLER, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS, ED GUERRICABEITIA, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 
DA VISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE, W ASHlNGTON MUTUAL CAPITOL PLAZA, 
SUITE 600, 199 NORTH CAPITOL BOULEV ARD, POST OFFICE BOX 1583, BOISE, IDAHO 
83701-1583, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named cross-appellants, DAVE CALLISTER. an individual, 
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, and LIBERTY 
PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho corporation, appeal against the above-named cross-respondents to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the order denying costs and fees to the cross-appellants entered in the 
above-entitled action on the 4th day of December, 2009, Honorable Judge Ronald J. Wilper 
presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 
1 1 (a)(7) I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement on appeal which the cross-appellant then intends to assert in 
the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the cross-appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal. 
Did the district court err in denying the cross-appellants, as prevailing parties, an 
award of attorney fees? 
4. (a) Is additional reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
(b) The cross-appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: The November 9,2009 hearing on Defendants' Motion for Costs and Fees. 
5. The cross-appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those designated by the 
appellant in the initial notice of appeal: 
a. Order on Costs and Fees (December 4,2009). 
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b. Defendants Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
(11/06/09). 
c. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney 
Fees (10/21/09). 
d. Affidavit in Support of Memorandum and Attorney Fees (10/09/09). 
e. Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees (10/09/09). 
f. Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (07/06/09). 
g. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (06/23/09). 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal and any request for additional transcript has 
been served on each reporter of whom an additional transcript has been requested as named below at 
the address set out below: 
Name and address: Dianne Cromwell, 200 W. Front Street, Boise. Idaho 83702-7300. 
(b) (1) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript and any additional documents requested in 
the cross-appeal. 
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to I.A.R. 
20. 
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Dated this ~day of January, 2010. 
Attorney for the Defendants/Respondents/ 
Cross-Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this /~4ay of January, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon the plaintiffs by the 
method indicated and addressed as follows: 
E. DON COPPLE 
ED GUERRICABEITIA 
DA VISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1583 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Email: 
[ ]U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Deli vered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[Xi Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Other _________ _ 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/ Appellants/Cross-Respondents 
Dianne Cromwell 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300 
Telephone: (208) 287-7587 
Court Reporter 
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[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
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Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
451 W State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
In re: Fuller v. Callister, Docket No. 37035 
Notice is hereby given that on Thursday, January 28, 2010, I lodged a 
transcript of 11 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with 
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
The following files were lodged: 
Proceeding 11/09/09 
David Cromwell 
Tucker & Associates 
cc: kloertscher@idcourts.net 
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court 
ASCII format of completed files emailed to counsel 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a married couple, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondnets, 
vs. 
DAVE CALLISTER, an individual, CONFLUENCE 
MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, and LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 37035 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
1,1. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 24th day of February, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk ofthe District Court 
By ____________ __ 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DAVID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a married couple, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondnets, 
vs. 
DAVE CALLISTER, an individual, CONFLUENCE 
MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, and LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 37035 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, 1. DA VID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
SUPPLEMENTAL CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRlPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
ED GUERRICABEITIA 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS 
CROSS RESPONDENTS 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: ----------------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
MICHAEL R. JONES 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
CROSS APPELLANTS 
BOISE, IDAHO 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a married couple, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondnets, 
vs. 
DA VE CALLISTER, an individual, CONFLUENCE 
MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, and LIDERTY PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants. 
Supreme Court Case No. 37035 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
1,1. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District ofthe 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record ofthe pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
9th day of October, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
